

# Hromadná rvačka Přes Okenní Sedadlo V Letadle Na Letišti El Salvador

[sputniknews.com/20230205/mass-brawl-over-window-seat-on-airplane-at-brazil-airport-1106983319.html](https://sputniknews.com/20230205/mass-brawl-over-window-seat-on-airplane-at-brazil-airport-1106983319.html)



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Na palubě letadla Brazilian Gol Airlines, které mělo ve čtvrtek 2. února odletět z brazilského Salvadoru do São Paula, došlo k hromadné rvačce 15 lidí. Příčinou konfliktu byla podle zpráv médií neschopnost matky sedět vedle sebe. invalidního syna.

Drby z letu Gol, že se 2 ženy začaly hádat a nakonec bylo z letadla vyhozeno 15 lidí 🤔  
[pic.twitter.com/2zQiNipsqe](https://pic.twitter.com/2zQiNipsqe)

— Přišel jsem k vám (@aqueleDrama) 3. února 2023

K incidentu došlo, když cestující nastupovali do letadla v São Paulu, podle Simple Flying. Ke konfliktu došlo mezi dvěma rodinami, když jedna z cestujících požádala druhou, aby si vyměnila sedadla v letadle, takže první mohla sedět se svým dítětem se speciálními potřebami. Ta žádost odmítla, což první rozzuřilo a začala na ni útočit. Hádka mezi dvěma pasažéry rychle přerostla v hromadný pěstní souboj, kterého se zúčastnilo celkem 15 členů rodiny. Zástupce GOL Airlines komentoval incident pro americká média následovně:

" GOL informuje, že scéna na videu, které koluje po sociálních sítích, se odehrála před startem letu G3 1659 tento čtvrtek (2. února) mezi Salvadorem (SSA) a Congonhas (CGH), v São Paulu. Všichni zúčastnění na místě činu násilí byli vylodění a nepokračovali v

*cestě. Společnost lituje jakéhokoli násilného činu a zdůrazňuje, že akce provedené týmem posádky byly podniknuty se zaměřením na bezpečnost, hodnotu číslo 1 GOL. “*

Na záběrech rvačky, které se dostaly na internet, je vidět, jak na sebe lidé křičí, mlátí se a tahají se za vlasy. Žhavost souboje vyvrcholila, když jedna z účastnic odhalila svá ňadra, protože jí vršek v důsledku aktivního pohybu sklouzl dolů.

Po nějaké době se letuškám podařilo převzít kontrolu nad situací.

„Už jsem zavíral dveře, když jsem viděl, jak se ti dva plácají v řadě 20. Běžel jsem, jakmile jsem tam došel, už jsem se dostal mezi ty dva, ale co se stane: Jedna rodina měla pět lidí a druhá 10. Obě rodiny se začaly fackovat, nadávat si,“ řekla médiím jedna z letušek.

Všichni účastníci rvačky byli eskortováni z letadla. Po téměř dvouhodinovém zpoždění letadlo přesto odletělo do Sao Paula, ale bez rowdies.

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Cesta muže, který byl kdysi považován za nejrespektovanějšího člověka v Americe, z pozice, kde se ujal amerického prezidenta, až po zdiskreditaci lháře a výrobce odpovědného za dovedení Ameriky k neúspěšné válce v Iráku Rada bezpečnosti Spojených národů, kde 5. února 2003 Powell pronesl projev, který byl zamýšlen jako argument pro americkou invazi do Iráku.

As junior officer in the Marine Corps in the 1980s, I only knew Colin Powell by reputation. When I joined the On-Site Inspection Agency in 1988, I was part of a team of inspectors implementing a landmark arms control agreement, the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty, which Powell, as the National Security Advisor to President Ronald Reagan, shepherded through the negotiations leading up to the treaty being signed, in December 1987, and through eventual ratification by the US Senate, in May 1988. I was part of a team of

OSIA officers who were tasked with providing briefings to the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee in the spring of 1988, and I recall passing Colin Powell as we made our way to the Senate secure conference room.



[Watch Ex-POTUS George W. Bush Admit ‘Brutal & Wholly Unjustified’ Invasion of Iraq in Freudian Slip](#)

19 May 2022, 08:30 GMT

Generals who worked directly for the President of the United States tend to impress young Lieutenants that way.

My next interaction with Colin Powell was during Operation Desert Storm, in January 1991. I was a junior intelligence officer of the staff of General Norman Schwarzkopf, the Commander of US Central Command. We were two weeks into the war, and the coalition assembled by President George H. W. Bush to evict Iraq from Kuwait was being threatened by the possibility of Israel entering the war. Iraq was firing indigenously modified SCUD missiles into Israel, and the inability of the coalition to prevent these attacks was causing Israel to threaten to intervene and get the job done itself.

There was tremendous pressure on General Schwarzkopf to kill SCUDs, and the US Air Force had diverted thousands of sorties to western Iraq to accomplish that task. In late January, one of these sorties, flown by F-15 Strike Eagles, attacked a convoy of vehicles it claimed were SCUD missiles. The video tape of that strike was

forwarded to Central Command Headquarters, in Riyadh, where US Air Force officers excitedly briefed General Schwarzkopf on the results — seven confirmed SCUD kills.

Eager to assuage Israeli concerns, Schwarzkopf held a press conference where he and the US Air Force component commander, Brigadier General “Buster” Glosson, played the tape while proudly proclaiming the US success in targeting and destroying Iraqi SCUDs.

There was just one problem — me. I was the battle damage analyst responsible for making the call on intelligence-based claims of SCUD kills, and my review of the Air Force tapes showed that what were being claimed as SCUDs were actually oil tankers, most probably sanction busters coming out of Jordan. The morning after General Schwarzkopf’s briefing, I prepared the official report on SCUD kills, and where it said “confirmed kills,” I put down “o.”

Soon after I submitted the report, I was confronted by a Colonel on Schwarzkopf’s staff, who asked me to “correct” the report. I told him the number was correct.

*“When the Commanding General goes on record saying that seven Iraqi SCUDs were killed,” the Colonel said, “the report produced by his staff had better reflect those numbers.”*



Председатель Объединенного комитета начальников штабов Колин Пауэлл указывает на авиабазы в Ираке во время презентации в Пентагоне, 1991 год

© AP Photo / Greg Gibson

I refused to change the report, noting that in my capacity as the officer responsible for ascertaining the accuracy of the numbers contained in the report, I could not claim seven kills when I knew that the number was zero.

### **I was fired on the spot.**

Before I was escorted out of the bunker, I passed a copy of my report, together with a written analysis of why I believed the number to be zero, to the senior Defense Intelligence Agency representative in Central Command. He forwarded the report to Washington, DC, where it ended up on the desk of Colin Powell, who at that time was serving as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The long and short of it was that Colin Powell backed me up. He had my report assessed by DIA analysts, who backed up my analysis.

While General Schwarzkopf refused to change the numbers, I did get my job back.

Colin Powell also had my back while serving as a weapons inspector with the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), overseeing the elimination of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. In the fall of 1991, the CIA made a concerted effort to remove from the ranks of UNSCOM three Americans who were “tainted” with the INF inspection experience. According to the CIA, the three persons, including myself, were “too soft” on Iraq because we insisted in following the letter of the law when it came to our mandate to inspect (similar to complying with the letter of the law while implementing the INF treaty.)

The matter reached the desk of Colin Powell, who immediately quashed the effort.

In September 1998, I finally had a chance to meet Colin Powell in person, during a conference in Aspen, Colorado organized by Teddy Forstmann, the CEO of Forstmann & Little, a major investment management company. Both Colin Powell and I were featured speakers at this event. We had a long conversation over breakfast, and then at lunch, where I was interviewed by Charlie Rose, Powell joined Sam Nunn and Henry Kissinger in rising to his feet to openly praise me as “a great American.”



On Anniversary of Invasion of Iraq, Ex-Arab League Chief Reflects on US Lies & Miscalculations

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It remains one of the highlights of my life.

Later, when we found ourselves on opposing sides in the leadup to the US invasion of Iraq, Colin Powell remained a class act, refusing to engage in the tactics of character assassination used by other Bush administration officials when trying to refute my claims that Iraq no longer had weapons of mass destruction worthy of a US-led war.

No amount of good feeling and positive past history, however, could repair the damage Colin Powell did to his reputation in my eyes when he presented himself before the United Nations Security Council on February 5, 2003, and made a case for war that was composed entirely of lies, distortions, and fabrications.



U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell holds up a vial that he said could contain anthrax as he presents evidence of Iraq's alleged weapons programs to the United Nations Security Council. (File)

© AP Photo / Elise Amendola

In my experience, Colin Powell had always represented the personification of a man of character who would always do the right thing.

But as I watched him spout lie after lie, I immediately saw him for what he truly was—an inadequate man who proved unworthy of the responsibilities given him.

Colin Powell had once said that his experience in Vietnam taught him that those in positions of power and authority could never again allow lies to shape policy when the lives of American servicemembers was on the line.

On that day, February 5, 2003, Colin Powell put the lie to that statement.

He failed the American people.

He failed the world.

Sám selhal.

Muž, který mohl být prvním afroamerickým prezidentem, se místo toho proměnil v jen další osobu slabé povahy, neschopnou dát všechno do čela, když bylo nejdůležitější chránit životy těch, kterým přísahal sloužit.

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