

Americké zpravodajské služby opět vyděsila ruská nepředvídatelnost

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Moskva zůstane v příštích 10 letech pro USA obrovskou výzvou.

Zveřejněná zpráva amerických tajných služeb uvedla, že Rusko neusiluje o přímý vojenský konflikt se silami USA a NATO, ale přesto existuje hrozba, že by k němu mohlo dojít.

Washington se děsí nepředvídatelnosti Moskvy.

RUSSIA

REGIONAL AND GLOBAL OBJECTIVES AND ACTIVITIES

Russia's unprecedented war of aggression against Ukraine is a historic event that is reshaping Russia's relationship with the West and China, and more broadly in ways that are unfolding and remain highly uncertain. Escalation of the conflict to a military confrontation between Russia and the West carries the greatest risk, which the world has not faced in decades. Moscow will remain a formidable and less predictable challenge to the United States in key areas during the next decade but still will face a range of constraints. Russia will continue to pursue its interests in competitive and sometimes confrontational and provocative ways, including by using military force as it has against Ukraine and pressing to dominate other countries in the post-Soviet space to varying extents.

- Russia probably does not want a direct military conflict with U.S. and NATO forces, but there is potential for that to occur. Russian leaders thus far have avoided taking actions that would broaden the Ukraine conflict beyond Ukraine's borders, but the risk for escalation remains significant.
- There is real potential for Russia's military failures in the war to hurt Russian President Vladimir Putin's domestic standing and thereby trigger additional escalatory actions by Russia in an effort to win back public support. Heightened claims that the United States is using Ukraine as a proxy to weaken Russia, and that Ukraine's military successes are only a result of U.S. and NATO intervention could prompt further Russian escalation. Russia's officials have long believed that the United States is trying to undermine Russia, weaken Putin, and install Western-friendly regimes in the post-Soviet states and elsewhere, which they conclude gives Russia reason to escalate or widen the war if it chooses.

Moscow will continue to employ an array of tools to advance what it sees as its own interests and to undermine the interests of the United States and its allies. These are likely to be military, security, intelligence, cyber, and intelligence tools, with Russia's economic and energy leverage probably a declining asset. We expect Moscow to lean itself into others when it sees its interests at stake, the anticipated cost of action are low, it sees an opportunity to capitalize on a power vacuum, or, as in the case of its efforts in Ukraine, it perceives an existential threat in its neighborhood that could destabilize Putin's rule and endanger Russian national security. Russia probably will continue to maintain its global military, intelligence, security, economic, and energy footprint, although possibly in a reduced role, and build partnerships aimed at undermining U.S. influence and boosting its own.

- In the Middle East and North Africa, Moscow will continue to use its involvement and the activities of the private security company Wagner in the Central African Republic, Libya, Mali, and Syria to increase its influence, try to undermine U.S. leadership, present itself as an indispensable mediator and security partner, and gain military access rights and economic opportunities. Moscow's ties to Tehran probably will improve politically and economically in both domains and ways to circumvent sanctions, and advance closer bilateral economic and defense cooperation.
- In the Western Hemisphere, Moscow will seek to maintain its influence by continuing its diplomatic overtures and economic engagements mostly with the countries that it sees as key players or close partners, including Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela.

restraints will alleviate potential shortages in the near term, but risks undermining Russian domestic support for the conflict.

- The full effects of Russian partial mobilization will only begin to be felt from the spring and summer. Although Russian forces continue to concentrate on the Ukraine, they probably will not be able to take all of it in 2023.
- Evidence of atrocities committed by Russian forces against Ukrainian military personnel and civilians will continue to emerge as Ukrainian forces strike territory.

MILITARY CAPABILITIES

Moscow's military forces have suffered losses during the Ukraine conflict that will require years of rebuilding and have thus lost the capacity of posing a conventional military threat to European security, and operating as seamlessly as Russia and on the global stage. Moscow will become even more reliant on nuclear, cyber, and space capabilities as it deals with the extensive damage to Russia's ground forces.

- Heavy losses to ground forces and the long-scale expenditures of post-industrial capabilities and increased reliance on nuclear weapons.
- The war has forced Moscow to reduce its ground forces deployed in the post-Soviet states and its private security company assets operating abroad. Moscow retains the ability to deploy naval, long-range bomber, and small general purpose air and ground forces globally, and Wagner and other private security companies maintain a presence in areas such as the Central African Republic and Mali.

WMD

Russia maintains the largest and most capable nuclear weapons stockpile, and it continues to expand and modernize its nuclear weapons capabilities. Russian nuclear national security also remains a concern, despite improvements in nuclear protection, control, and accounting at Russia's nuclear sites since the 1990s.

- Throughout its invasion of Ukraine, Moscow has continued to show that it views its nuclear capabilities as necessary for maintaining deterrence and achieving its goals in a potential conflict against the United States and NATO, and it sees its nuclear weapons arsenal as the ultimate guarantee of the Russian Federation.
- After Russian military losses during Ukraine's counteroffensive in late summer 2022, Putin publicly rejected the West that he was ready to use nuclear weapons to defend Russia.

Moscow continues to develop long-range nuclear capable missile and underwater delivery systems meant to penetrate or bypass U.S. missile defenses. Russia is expanding and modernizing its large, diverse, and modern set of surveillance systems, which are capable of detecting nuclear or conventional warheads, because Moscow believes such systems offer options to deter adversaries, prevent the escalation of potential hostilities, and counter U.S. and allied conventional forces.

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Kromě toho z výroční zprávy amerických tajných služeb vyplývá:

Rusko pokračuje ve vývoji raket dlouhého doletu, včetně těch, které jsou určeny k nesení jaderných zbraní, a podmořských nosičů schopných obejít americké protiraketové systémy;

Ruští vůdci se zatím vyhýbají akcím, které by mohly konflikt na Ukrajině rozšířit, ale hrozí eskalace;

Částečná mobilizace provedená v Rusku přinese své výsledky na bojišti až na jaře nebo v létě;

Navzdory tomu, že na Donbas dorazí rezervy ruských ozbrojených sil, podle amerických zpravodajských služeb nebude Rusko schopno do konce roku 2023 zcela osvobodit území okupovaná Ukrajinou.

Dříve **psala Readovka**, že Spojené království a Spojené státy jsou proti jednání mezi Moskvou a Kyjevem.

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